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cumstances to determine the existence of conflicting interests. 47 While the
rule may receive criticism as being potentially harsh and mechanistic, its
utility is undoubted where the court is convinced, as in the class action
context, that an inherent conflict exists. The court's utilization of canon 9 as
the sole basis for its opinion signals a willingness to respond to public
criticism of the legal profession by putting significant pressure on attorneys
to consider not only legal and ethical considerations of their conduct, but the
public impression as well. By its adoption of this general rule of prohibition,
the court has eliminated a potential conflict harmful to interests of class
members, as well as having provided a remedy for criticism of attorney
motivation in the pursuit of class actions generally.
IV. CONCLUSION
When faced with class actions in which an attorney appears as both
named plaintiff and as class counsel courts have applied differing remedies
to cure a conflict of interests if, indeed, a conflict is found to exist. The
Third Circuit in Kramer concluded that all such situations, at a minimum,
appear to pose a financial conflict of interest and should be cured by
disqualification of the attorney serving as class counsel. The court based its
conclusion and the scope of its ruling on canon 9 and, thus, avoided case-by-
case determinations of factual issues of impropriety.
Noel Hensley
The Proper Scope of the Non-Profit Institutions Exemption:
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists Association
Abbott Laboratories and eleven other pharmaceutical manufacturers sold
drugs at prices lower than those charged commercial pharmacies to certain
hospitals for resale in their pharmacies. Portland Retail Druggists Associa-
tion, as assignee of more than sixty commercial pharmacies, brought this
antitrust action against the defendants for an alleged violation of the Robin-
son-Patman Act.' Defendants claimed the challenged sales were exempt
under the Non-Profit Institutions Act, 2 which excludes from the application
47. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's attorney
who previously represented defendant in litigation involving identical issue barred from appear-
ing for plaintiff as breach of professional ethics resulting from the improper appearance that
prior confidences might not be preserved).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale . . . and where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce . . ..
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970): "Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 21a of this title, shall apply
to purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public
libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
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of the Robinson-Patman Act the purchase by a non-profit institution3 of
"supplies for their own use." 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in vacating the district court's decision in favor of the non-
profit institutions, concluded that a hospital's purchase of drugs was not for
its own use if its pharmacy resold the drugs to private consumers. 5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, vacated and remanded: The Non-
Profit Institutions Act exempts from the purview of the Robinson-Patman
Act discount drug sales to non-profit hospitals only if the use of the dis-
counted drugs is part of or promotes the hospitals' intended institutional
operations. Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association,
96 S. Ct. 1305, 47 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1976).
I. EXEMPTION OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS FROM THE PURVIEW
OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The idea that discriminations in price could be a form of destructive
competition which should be regulated by Congress developed shortly after
the turn of the twentieth century. 6 Until that time Congress was primarily
concerned with dissolving the large monopolistic combinations that had
developed in the major industries such as oil and steel. The Sherman Act of
1890 was the first major legislative effort aimed at dissolving these monop-
olies. 7 It soon became apparent, however, that regulation of the pricing
activities of giant United States industries was needed if competition was to
be preserved.
8
The first specific congressional attempt to regulate price discrimination
was embodied in section 2 of the Clayton Act as adopted in 1914. 9 The
ultimate purpose of the Clayton Act was to secure the protection of the
public against the evils which resulted from the lessening of competition, 0
3. There are a variety of definitions of non-profit institutions. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4437d (Vernon 1976): " 'Nonprofit hospital' means any hospital owned and
operated by a corporation or association, no part of the net earnings of which inures, or may
lawfully inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
4. Other statutory exemptions provided by the Robinson-Patman Act include: price
differentials due to differences in cost; price changes due to changing market conditions; and
good faith attempt to meet the competition. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b) (1970).
5. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1974).
6. For a definitive treatment of the history of antitrust law see E. KINTNER, AN ANTI-
TRUST PRIMER (2d ed. 1973). See generally 16 V. KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
ANTI-TRUST & TRADE REGULATION § 1.03, at 1-39 (1970); J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTI-TRUST LAWS 1-95 (1976); Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41
VA. L. REV. 759 (1955).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Section I provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
. . . is declared to be illegal." See also E. KINTNER, supra note 6, at 1-55.
8. See New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346 (3d
Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965). See also E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT PRIMER
(1970).
9. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 42, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act sought to reach certain specified practices which had been held by the courts to be outside
the ambit of the Sherman Act but which Congress considered dangerous to free competition.
The original § 2 of the Clayton Act sought to reach and eliminate regional price cutting
employed by large nationwide concerns for the purpose of destroying smaller and weaker rivals
and thereby entrenching their monopolistic position. See F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962 & Supp. 1964). See also 16B V. KALINOWSKI, supra
note 6, § 21.02 on the background, purpose, and application of the original § 2 of the Clayton
Act.
10. Our national economic policy has long been based on the belief in the value of
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and, consequently, section 2 was directed at the territorial price discrimina-
tion practiced by large monopolies. Section 2, however, applied only where
such price discrimination substantially lessened competition or tended to
create a monopoly;" discounts based on differences in quantities sold were
exempted. 12
The Robinson-Patman Act 13 was adopted in 1936 to remedy inadequacies
in the Sherman Act by strengthening the provisions regarding all price
discriminations. 4 The opportunity for large volume buyers to gain price
preferences was eliminated, 15 and small businesses were protected from
discrimination by large interstate concerns. 16 The heart of the Robinson-
Patman Act, section 13(a), repeals section 2(a) of the Clayton Act and
prohibits sellers from discriminating in price. It does, however, provide a
defense when an otherwise unlawful price discrimination could be justified
by the seller's expenses.' 7
Shortly after the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act a question arose
concerning its possible detrimental effect on the operations of non-profit
institutions. 8 Congressional response to this problem came with the passage
of the Non-Profit Institutions Act' 9 which exempted sales to non-profit
institutions of supplies 20 that were for the institutions' own use. 21 Although
competition; the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts sought to remove restraints
from competition. Nawalonic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust Laws, 21
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 97 (1972).
11. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). See also ABA ANTI-TRUST
SECTION, ANTI-TRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-68 (1975).
12. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 42, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). In part the proviso declared that
"nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of com-
modities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or
that makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling or transportation."
13. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
14. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). See also Hampton v.
Graff Vending Co., 478 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973).
15. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960). The Robinson-Patman Act
sought to proscribe those devices by which large buyers gained preferences over smaller ones
by virtue of their greater purchasing power. Section 2 of the Clayton Act was felt by many to be
inadequate to deal with what was looked upon as a new danger to the competitive system,
namely, the rapid growth of chain stores and the resulting decline of independents. F. ROWE,
supra note 9, at 3-23. See also Elias, Robinson-Patman: Time for Rechiseling, 26 MERCER L.
REV. 689 (1975).
16. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). See also FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505 (1963); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
17. See note 4 supra for a list of the generally available statutory defenses to the Robinson-
Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) provides: "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery .... " See also United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1953); Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d
780 (10th Cir. 1964). The Robinson-Patman Act is concerned primarily with possible injury to
competition and not to competitors. Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 478 F.2d 527, 533 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973).
18. The legislation was prompted in good part by a letter from the president of the Hospital
Bureau of Standards and Supplies calling attention to hospital supply bills increasing twenty
percent as a result of the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. S. REP. No. 1769, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 1 (1938). Legislative history evidences an intent by the Senate and the House to allow
non-profit institutions to operate as inexpensively as possible. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 2161,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970); see -note 2 supra.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970); see Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). See also note 30 infra and accompanying text for the
definition of "supplies."
21. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970). This section, having been enacted after adoption of § 13 of this
title. is to be construed as adding to existing exemptions, rather than as repealing exemptions by
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litigation involving challenges to this exemption has been sparse, it has
centered on controversies over the definitions of "supplies" and purchases
"for their own use."
Traditionally, parties bringing actions under section 13(a) 22 have sought to
exclude from the exemption practices that are only tangentially related to
the purposes of the non-profit institution, and have succeeded only where
the activity had an independent profit motive. 23 For example, in Students
Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co. 24 the court held that the exemption
did not extend to the sale of law books to a university campus bookstore
because "the books were not for the use of the university but for resale at
profit."2 5 In contrast, the court in Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. 26
held that the. sale of bowling lanes to a university bowling facility con-
structed primarily "to fill the needs of the. . . students, faculty, and staff"
was within the exemption.27 The purchases were exempt despite the avail-
ability of the facility to the general public.28 A public bowling alley had
sought relief on the ground that the sale by Brunswick was not within the
exemption because the public's use of the university's alleys for a fee meant
that the purchases were neither supplies nor for the university's own use. 2 9
The court interpreted the word "supplies" to include not only stock mate-
rials needed for daily operations, but also "anything required to meet the
institution's needs, whether it is consumed or otherwise disposed of, or
whether it constitutes, or becomes part of, an object utilized to enable the
institution to carry on its activities." '30 The court held that even if the
supplies had been used substantially by the public, the sale would be exempt
because it was made to a non-profit institution for its own use.3'
II. ABBOTT LABORATORIES V. PORTLAND
RETAIL DRUGGISTS ASSOCIATION
The hospital pharmacies involved in Abbott Laboratories all resold the
items purchased from the drug manufacturers to patients, staff, and the
inference. General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D. Ky.
1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1942).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) for the remedies available to aggrieved parties.
23. E. KINTNER. supra note 8, at 201.
24. 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956).
25. Id. at 51 n.5. The court decided for Washington Law Book Company because it found
the transactions with the university bookstore were consignments rather than sales, thereby
making the bookstore the sales agent instead of the buyer. The transactions were not, therefore,
in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 52.
26. 378 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967).
27. Id. at 215. Here all income resulting from use of the purchased supplies was used to
finance student activity programs or to expand or improve the university. One of the uses of the
equipment was to fulfill the physical education requirement, thus making the purchase of the
supplies "for their own use." d. at 216.
28. Affidavits showed that approximately 2,000 of the 125,000 games bowled on these
lanes were by the general public. Id.
29. The plaintiff in Logan Lanes relied on Students Book Co. to assert that the purchases
were made for a self-sustaining student facility for resale at a profit. The circuit court distin-
guished Students Book Co. on the basis of the physical educational requirement.
30. 378 F.2d at 216; see Nawalonic, supra note 10, at 102-04.
31. 378 F.2d at 216. The Ninth Circuit did not seem influenced by the fact that the general
public had full use of the facility. Indeed, because the supplies in question were capital items
incapable of being divided for use by different types of patrons, the fact that one of the
purposes was to fulfill the physical education requirement meant that the entire purchase was
for the institution's own use.
1977]
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general public. 32 The issues demanding the Court's attention were the proper
construction of the language in the Non-Profit Institutions Act and the
extent to which judicial recognition and protection should be given to the
expanding community service role of the modern non-profit hospital.3 3 A
novel situation was presented in Abbott Laboratories since there were
various categories of dispensations made by the hospital pharmacies of the
drugs purchased from the petitioners. Most of the sales, such as to emer-
gency room visitors and hospital inpatients, were unquestionably within the
statute's exemption as being "for their own use."34 Sales to outpatients,
employees, walk-in customers, and refill sales, however, were not so pre-
cisely defined. Thus, the problem for the Court was clearly in focus; a line
had to be drawn, 35 and in so doing a proper construction of the statute's
language had to be determined. 36 Tangentially, the Court, in clarifying the
statute, would define the limits of the activities in which non-profit hospitals
could engage and still come under the aegis of the Non-Profit Institutions
Act.
The district court decided on the evidence presented that the hospitals
were non-profit institutions and that their purchases of drugs for resale in
their pharmacies were for their own use within the meaning of the statute,
and, therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 37 The
district court found that a vast majority of the products purchased were
clearly for the hospitals' use, that the outpatient treatment was not outside
the purview of the Act, that take-home drugs and drugs sold to staff
physicians and employees were also properly exempt, and that sales to
walk-in traffic were of insufficient quantities to withdraw the exemption. 38
On appeal the Ninth Circuit agreed that most of the sales were clearly within
32. The Court found that sales by the hospital pharmacies fell into several categories: (1) to
the inpatient for use in his treatment at the hospital; (2) to the emergency room patient for use in
the patient's treatment on site; (3) to the outpatient for personal use on the hospital premises;
(4) to the inpatient or emergency room patient upon his discharge for personal use away from
the hospital; (5) to the outpatient for personal use away from the premises; (6) to former
patients, by way of refills; (7) to a hospital employee or student for personal use or the use of
his dependent; (8) to the staff physician for personal use or the use of his dependent; (9) to the
staff physician for use in his private practice; and (10) to the non-patient walk-in customer. 96
S. Ct. at 1312, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
33. Id. at 1310, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 544. For a general discussion of the expanding role of the
non-profit institution see Nawalonic, supra note 10. See also Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and
the New Non-Profit Corporation Laws, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 145 (1971); Oleck, Non-Profit
Types, Uses and Abuses: 1970, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 207 (1970).
34. 96 S. Ct. at 1312, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 549; see note 32 supra.
35. The definition the Court placed on "for their own use" mandated that some purchases
necessary to carry on the hospital's functions could not be considered for their own use. As
long as the institution's intended operation was thought to be the care of its patients, sales not
tangentially related to such operation could not be exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. Id.
at 1316, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 550-51.
36. The primary purpose of the Court in hearing this case was to resolve the confusion
caused by the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Logan Lanes and Abbott Laboratories. See Portland
Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1974). The circuit court
distinguished Abbott Laboratories from Logan Lanes on the ground that plant equipment, such
as bowling lanes, could not be segregated as to use, while consumptive supplies could. Since the
hospital could have segregated the supplies as to intended use, and since they sold some of
these to the public for profit, the purchases could not be called "for their own use." Id. at 489;
see note 29 supra.
37. The district court's opinion was delivered orally. A summary of that court's holding
can be found in the Supreme Court's opinion. 96 S. Ct. at 1310, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 546.
38. Id. at 1306, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 538.
[Vol. 3 1
the proper definition of "for their own use." 39 All the sales were "proper
hospital functions" and could thus be justified as a proper and useful
community service. The court held, however, that these sales, although
proper hospital services, were not always "purchases for their own use" for
the purpose of antitrust exemptions. The Ninth Circuit decided that for the
sale to be exempted from antitrust scrutiny the hospital had to be the actual
consumer. Therefore, the court held that the concept of "for their own use"
only applied to traditional sales by the hospital to a private consumer where
the drugs sold were prescribed and administered incident to treatment at the
hospital.4"
The Supreme Court recognized the parties' respective interpretations of
the legislative history of the Act, but was persuaded by neither.41 Instead,
the Court held that while the exemption to the non-profit institutions should
not be strictly confined to their traditional activities, the exemption could not
automatically be extended to any new venture that the non-profit institution
found attractive.4 2 Exemptions from antitrust statutes are to be construed
strictly4 3 since the Robinson-Patman Act is to be read broadly to effectuate
its purposes." The Court properly concluded, therefore, that the exemption
is a limited one;45 the test for exemption is the obvious one inherent in the
statute's language, with "for their own use" meaning that which is reason-
ably regarded as use by the hospital in that such use is part of or promotes
the hospital's intended institutional operation.46
In order to determine which uses came within this limitation the Court
reviewed the various categories of sales by the hospital pharmacies. Apart
from the categories such as sales to inpatients, emergency room patients,
and outpatients, over which there is no dispute as to the exemption's
applicability, 47 the Court held that take-home prescriptions also should be
within the exempt status since to rule otherwise would arbitrarily draw a line
at the hospital door which would be inconsistent with the intent of the
39. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir.
1974).
40. Id. The court held that hospital use under § 13c must be limited to use in dispensing
drugs for hospital or clinic treatment of inpatients or emergency room visitors. Thus, the court
believed "own use" meant only use by patients in the hospital's beds or on their tables.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 1314, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 548. The commercial pharmacies asserted that the
exemption was never intended to countenance a mass invasion of the retail market by hospitals
and that Congress had only the hospitals' traditional roles in mind. The petitioners, however,
asserted that the focus was to be on the character of the institution, not the particular features
of the program.
42. Id. at 1314, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 549. The Court noted that the exemption as passed deleted
the original restriction that only sales to non-profit institutions supported by public subscrip-
tions would be exempt. See 86 CONG. REC. 6065 (1938). Therefore, an intent was evidenced not
to limit the hospital's traditional role for the purpose of allowing an antitrust exemption. The
language did not, however, give non-profit institutions a blank check.
43. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956). See also Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 395 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1969).
44. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
45. 96 S. Ct. at 1314, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
46. Id. The Court held that this interpretation properly changes the focus from the purch-
ase to the use, as § 13c requires. Id. The Court showed an intention to be more concerned with
the motives and status of the institution than its practices.
47. Id. at 1315, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 549. The druggist association agreed that sales of this type
were clearly "for their own use."
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Non-Profit Institutions Act.48 Similarly, sales to employees and staff physi-
cians for their personal use and use by their dependents were determined by
the Court to be essential to the smooth functioning of the hospital 9 and,
thus, within the Court's definition of "for their own use."
The Court excluded from the exemption sales to employees and staff for
other than personal use,50 refills of prescriptions,51 and sales to the general
public on a walk-in basis.5 2 The parameter thus drawn seems consistent with
the Court's view that "for their own use" means use that is part of or
promotes the care of persons who are its patients. Though acknowledging
the fact that the modern hospital has assumed an expanded role in the health
care of the community," the Court believed that the extension of section 13c
to the walk-in public citizen would make the hospital pharmacy a community
drug store occupying a position of unfair economic advantage devastating to
competing commercial pharmacies.
The Court correctly believed that the overriding purpose of the exemption
was to allow non-profit institutions to operate as inexpensively as possible.54
In addition, however, the proper purpose of the "for their own use" limita-
tion is to preclude the institution from taking advantage of the antitrust
exemption by buying low-cost supplies solely for the purpose of reselling
them at a profit.5 5 The focus of the Court's attention was, correctly, the
nexus between the particular sales and the institution's charitable activities.
The nexus should be more closely scrutinized when a profit is made to
assure the sales are not made primarily for that purpose. 6 A concurring
opinion by Justice Marshall 7 made it clear that the Court welcomes expan-
sion of charitable institutions' exempted activities and that the Court will not
follow the circuit court's reasoning that purchases will not be called "for
their own use" unless they are for the institution's consumption.58 Rather, if
48. This type of treatment is the next link in the chain. Although medical and hospital
supervision decreases, the link is still continuous and real. Thus, these types of sales do
promote the hospital's intended operation. Id. at 1315, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 550.
49. Here again these sales promote the intended operation of the hospital because the
employers and staff enable it to function. Id. The Court was not convinced, however, by the
petitioner's argument that sales of this type were often required in current collective bargaining
agreements.
50. Id. at 1316, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 550.
51. The line was drawn at this point because the Court was of the opinion that after the
patient had been treated at the hospital and given medication to continue the healing process at
home the hospital's intended function had ceased. Sales beyond that point were too attenuated
to be within the intended exemption. Id. at 1315, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 550.
52. Id. at 1316, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 551. The institutions' intended purposes were clearly
exceeded in sales of this type. At this point the hospital pharmacies became merely retail
competitiors.
53. See E. FISCH, D. FREED & E. SCHACHTER, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS
§ 322 (1974). See also Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 237, 238-40
(1970).
54. See S. REP. No. 1769, supra note 18. See also H.R. REP. No. 2161, supra note 18.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 1314, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 544.
56. When sales are for profit, analysis is furthered by recognition of the "for their own
use" limitation. Thus, sales only arguably within the scope of the institution's charitable
activities might be exempted when made on a non-profit basis and not exempted when made for
profit. Id. See E. KINTNER, supra note 8, at 201-02. The weight given to non-profit status
should decrease when non-profit institutions become involved with profit-making activities in
competition with commercial concerns.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 1318, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 552.
58. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d at 489.
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the activity can properly be said to be promoting the intended institutional
operation, then purchases for that activity will enjoy exempt status.
III. CONCLUSION
The concept of the non-profit institution and its necessary and appropriate
activities has vastly changed since the Non-Profit Institutions Act was
passed in 1938, and it has become necessary to reevaluate the scope of the
protection required to insure their continued existence. Helping non-profit
institutions operate as inexpensively as possible by exempting certain of
their purchases of supplies from antitrust scrutiny is still a workable and
practical legislative aid. As the scope of activities assumed by such institu-
tions broadens, however, the competition they offer to commercial counter-
parts correspondingly intensifies. In Abbott Laboratories the Supreme
Court recognized the potential economic burdens the Non-Profit Institutions
Act may cause and logically delineated the limits within which the Act's
exemption may be used. If the purchase of equipment has a direct relation-
ship to the organization's non-profit purpose, then a broad exemption to
such an organization under the Non-Profit Institutions Act is both reason-
able and warranted.
Charles R. Gibbs
19771 NOTES

